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ABSTRACT	
	
	
	
This	article	takes	up	the	question	of	“crime	writing”	and	rejoins	the	debate	around	
whether	such	literature	stands	in	for	the	“political	novel”	in	postapartheid	South	
Africa.	What	social	function	might	crime	writing	be	serving?	Research	by	political	
economists	and	cultural	anthropologists	suggests	that	acts	of	writing	in	“social	
detection”	mode	(rather	than	“crime	writing”)	serve	as	an	allegory	for	occulted	
sociopolitical	conditions.	Cultural	difference	is	seen,	once	again,	to	play	a	pivotal	
role	in	the	legitimation	of	power,	and	writers	in	the	detection	mode	are	
correspondingly	seen	to	be	probing	the	possibility	of	a	resurgence	of	“bad”	
difference.	This	notion,	it	is	argued,	is	a	key	differentiator	in	an	otherwise	murky	
scene	in	which	the	borderline	between	licit	and	illicit,	and	right	and	wrong,	has	
become	obscure.	While	many	South	African	writers	are	brought	into	the	discussion,	
including	but	not	restricted	to	crime	authors,	a	key	novel	by	leading	crime	writer	
Deon	Meyer	is	read	as	a	case	study	to	illustrate	the	more	general	points	made	in	the	
article.	
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From	the	Subject	of	Evil	to	the	Evil	Subject:	‘Cultural	Difference’	in	Postapartheid	
South	African	Crime	Fiction	
	
Introduction	
One	of	the	more	energetic	debates	about	postapartheid	South	African	literature	
revolves	around	the	question	why	“genre	fiction,”	and	more	particularly	crime	
fiction,	so	heavily	dominates	the	book	market.	This	debate	has	mostly	been	
conducted	anecdotally	or	superficially,	in	reviews	and	comments	on	literary	
websites,	despite	scattered	articles	and	one	or	two	special	issues	on	the	topic.1	
Particularly	contested	has	been	my	own	suggestion	that	crime	thrillers	may	have	
come	to	stand	in	for	what	used	to	seen	as	“political”	or	engaged	fiction,	in	response	
to	which	some	academics	have	argued	that	the	generic	or	formulaic	nature	of	
detective	novels	prevents	them	from	securing	substantial	purchase	on	sociopolitical	
issues.2	A	common	strand	has	been	the	contention	that	it	is	far‐fetched	to	think	
genre	fiction	can	be	seen	to	engage	in	political	themes	with	as	much	import	as	
																																																								
1	For	special‐issue	treatment,	see	Current	Writing	25	(2)	2013,	which	is	devoted	to	crime	fiction	in	
South	Africa,	with	articles	by	Sam	Naidu;	Elizabeth	le	Roux;	Anneke	Rautenbach;	Priscilla	Boshoff;	
Sabine	Binder;	Claudia	Drawe;	Elizabeth	Fletcher;	Jessica	Murray;	and	Margie	Orford.	Another	South	
African	journal,	scrutiny2,	published	a	special	issue	on	the	same	topic	in	2014,	with	pieces	by	Colette	
Guldimann;	Sam	Naidu;	Caitlin	Martin	and	Sally‐Ann	Murray;	Elizabeth	le	Roux	and	Samantha	
Buitendach;	Antoinette	Pretorius;	and	Jonathan	Amid	and	Leon	de	Kock.	Other	articles	include	
Titlestad	and	Polatinsky,	“Turning	to	Crirme”;	Anderson,	“Watching	the	Detectives”;	and	Warnes,	
“Writing	Crime.”	For	a	book‐length	study	on	the	larger	Southern	African	zone,	see	Primorac,	
Whodunnit	in	Southern	Africa.	For	an	idea	of	the	kind	of	content	on	website	debates,	see	
http://slipnet.co.za/view/reviews/crime‐fiction‐the‐%E2%80%98new‐political‐
novel%E2%80%99/	
2	See,	for	example,	the	SLiPnet	citation	in	Footnote	1,	directly	above,	in	which	a	range	of	academics	
weigh	in	on	the	matter	in	the	comments	section	following	my	review	essay	of	Roger	Smith’s	crime	
thriller	Dust	Devils.	I	first	raised	the	issue	of	crime	novels	and	sociopolitical	content	in	2010	in	the	
South	African	Sunday	Independent	newspaper	in	a	review	of	Mike	Nicol’s	novel,	Killer	Country	(“Hits	
Keep	Coming,”	http://www.leondekock.co.za/wp‐content/uploads/mike_nicol.pdf),	followed	it	up	in	
2011	in	the	Johannesburg‐based	Mail	&	Guardian	weekly	in	a	review	of	Nicol’s	Black	Heart	(“High	
Noon	in	the	Badlands,”	http://mg.co.za/article/2011‐05‐06‐high‐noon‐in‐the‐badlands/),	and	again	
in	2013	in	the	Cape	Times,	in	a	review	of	Nicol’s	Of	Cops	and	Robbers,	in	the	Cape	Times	(“Hardboiled	
Noir,”	http://www.leondekock.co.za/wp‐content/uploads/Cape‐Times‐Books‐page2‐30‐August‐
20131‐copy.pdf).	The	Sunday	Independent	used	my	comments	on	crime	fiction	as	possibly	the	“new	
political	novel”	as	the	basis	for	a	series	of	opinions	by,	among	others,	Imraan	Coovadia,	Mbongeni	
Buthelezi,	and	Kelwyn	Sole	(http://sundayindybooks.blogspot.com/search?q=novel+debate).	
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Gordimer,	Serote,	Langa,	Mda	and	others	have	done	in	the	past.	The	majority	of	such	
commentary,	as	suggested	above,	has	taken	on	the	form	of	contrasting	stabs	of	
opinion	in	the	comment	boxes	of	digital	literary	media,	and	as	such	does	not	
penetrate	much	beyond	provisional	position‐taking.		
An	exception	to	this	trend	is	Michael	Titlestad	and	Ashlee	Polatinsky’s	essay,	
“‘Turning	to	Crime’:	Mike	Nicol’s	The	Ibis	Tapestry	and	Payback,”	in	which	the	
authors	argue	that	Nicol’s	own	turn	from	serious	fiction	(as	exemplified	by	his	1998	
novel	The	Ibis	Tapestry)	to	the	popular	form	of	crime	fiction	(as	in	his	2008	novel	
Payback),	represents	an	unfortunate	withdrawal	from	more	serious	literary	writing	
in	which	matters	are	fittingly	in	a	state	of	unresolved	tension.	Instead	of	keeping	
faith	with	the	open‐form	novel,	Nicol	gives	way	to	the	temptation	of	neat	but	
ultimately	superficial	gestures	of	closure.	Although	Titlestad	and	Polatinsky	do	not	
say	so	explicitly,	there	is	a	palpable	sense	in	their	argument	of	disappointment	that	
an	outstanding	South	African	author,	in	the	older,	more	serious	vein	of	South	African	
writing,	should	sell	out	to	the	enticements	of	a	popular	market	of	fiction	in	which	
relatively	cheap	“answers”	are	neatly	laid	out	via	generic	form.	The	pre‐2000	
literature’s	intense	grappling	with	the	challenges	of	cultural	difference	appears	to	
have	given	way	to	“thriller”	computations	of	the	social	totality	in	which	difference,	
now	gleefully	colored	into	the	supposedly	blank	spaces	of	the	postapartheid	
dispensation,	adds	up	to	premature	closure,	as	if	the	new	democracy	is	little	more	
than	a	motley	gangland	version	of	the	“rainbow	nation.”	Reading	Titlestad	and	
Polatinsky,	one	finds	it	difficult	not	to	agree	that,	if	it	is	indeed	true	that	crime	fiction	
does	little	more	than	dish	out	over‐eager	visions	of	closure,	such	totalisation	would	
be	premature,	to	say	the	least.	The	sense	of	disinvestment	that	is	implied	in	
Titlestad	and	Polatinsky’s	argument,	a	divestiture	of	multilayered	texture	and	
imponderable	complexity	in	fiction	for	the	sake	of	flimsy	surface	resolution	and	easy	
entertainment,	is	helped	along	by	some	of	Nicol’s	own	statements.	These	utterances	
(in	my	opinion,	as	disingenuous	as	Athol	Fugard’s	protestations	that	his	writing	is	
“not	political”)	make	the	case	that	he	has	abandoned	serious	fiction	to	write	what	he	
calls	“commercial	[genre]	fiction”	because	he	supposedly	enjoys	it	more,	and	it	sells	
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better.3	So,	in	a	sense,	Titlestad	and	Polatinsky’s	article	reads,	to	take	my	
extrapolation	further,	as	a	parable	for	a	literature	that	has	lost	the	plot,	and	
consequently	its	sense	of	direction.	This,	indeed,	is	a	common	theme	in	discussions	
of	postapartheid	writing	(cf.	MacKenzie	and	Frenkel).4	Being	so	lost,	one	might	
argue,	the	newer	literature	now	grabs	onto	the	easy	solution	of	genre	fiction,	with	a	
mere	patina	of	political	content	in	its	preoccupation	with	social	violence,	or	“crime.”	
In	the	subtext	of	Titlestad	and	Polatinsky’s	argument,	proper,	one	is	invited	to	read	
the	story	of	a	once‐great	literature,	with	redoubtable	names	like	Gordimer,	Leroux,	
Mphahlele,	Brink,	Matshoba,	Coetzee,	Hope,	Ndebele,	Vladisavic,	Mda,	Serote,	
Breytenbach,	Langa,	Van	Niekerk,	Van	Heerden,	et	al,	now	dumbing	down	quite	
alarmingly.	The	post‐transitional	writers	are	seen	as	copping	out	of	the	real	deal,	
which	is	complexity	and	openness,	for	the	sake	of	quick‐sell,	flimflam	entertainment.	
These	supposedly	cheap	tricks,	in	addition,	feed	off	a	still‐volatile	society	in	a	
manner	that	some	may	regard	as	being	on	the	brink	of	unethical.		
Titlestad	and	Polatinsky’s	argument	is	sound,	and	well	executed,	although	
possibly	fallible	to	the	critique	executed	by	Cambridge‐based	South	Africanist	
scholar	Chris	Warnes,5	who	detects	a	“popular”	and	“highbrow”	binary	in	their	
reasoning.	Without	going	into	the	merits	of	an	argument	that	compels	one	to	choose	
between	“high”	and	“low”	forms,	I	would	like	to	suggest	that	there	may	be	a	different	
way	of	looking	at	Nicol’s	work,	and	that	of	other	crime	writers.	This	article,	then,	
asks	a	different	question	of	crime	fiction,	one	which	might	be	introduced	as	follows:	
What	if	one	were	to	read	the	large	(although	by	no	means	universal)	shift	from,	let’s	
say,	social‐realist	“complexity”	to	crime‐detective	“genre,”	as	something	else	
entirely?	This	would	involve	reading	such	writing	as	indicative	of	a	bigger	
movement,	a	seismic	shift	in	the	social	body	itself.	What	if	the	efflorescence	in	South	
African	“crime	writing,”	in	all	its	forms,6	rather	than	muffling	variegation	or	selling	
																																																								
3	See	SLiPnet	review	cited	above	on	Nicol’s	reported	statements	about	his	own	crime	writing.	
4	Mackenzie,	Craig,	and	Ronit	Frenkel,	“Conceptualizing	Post‐Transitional	Literature”.	
5	Warnes,	Chris,	“Writing	Crime,”	983.	
6	For	example,	police	procedural,	noir,	fallible	detective,	nonfiction	“inside‐stories”	about	the	
resurgent	social	monster	called	“crime,”	social	biographies	of	known	public	thugs,	and	still	more.	
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out	on	intricate	“entanglement,”7	is	in	fact	prizing	open	some	much	larger	goings	on	
in	a	manifestly	transformed	social	condition?	This	is	a	condition,	moreover,	that	is	
no	longer	just	national,	just	“South	African,”	but	transnational	in	its	dimensions,	and	
global	in	its	derivations.		
	 The	reformulated	question,	then,	might	be	put	as	follows:	Why	this	
obsession,	in	the	new	millennium,	with	law	and	(dis)order,	and	more	particularly	
with	the	spectacle	of	“crime,”	as	presented	in	mediated	forms	such	as	fiction	and	
nonfiction	writing?	Articulated	in	this	way,	the	question	leads	us	away	from	the	
ultimately	futile	war	of	opinion	about	whether	or	not	crime	fiction	is	sufficiently	
“literary,”	or	adequately	complex	as	an	object	of	formal	literary	architecture.	
Instead,	it	concentrates	our	attention	on	the	question	what	is	this	fiction	about,	and	
what	is	it	doing	out	there,	regardless	of	the	finer	points	of	literary	merit.	This,	
indeed,	is	the	issue	to	which	Warnes	also	directs	scholars	of	South	African	writing,	
suggesting	that	writers	such	as	Meyer	and	Orford	“keep	faith	with	some	of	the	core	
features	of	‘serious’	South	African	literature:	its	capacity	to	document	social	reality,	
to	expose	injustice,	and	to	conscientise	readers	into	different	modes	of	thought	and	
action.”8	To	this	I	would	add	that	the	“core”	question	for	a	scholar	of	literature	is	
also	the	following:	Why	the	relatively	sudden,	and	major,	shift	in	circulation	and	
reception	from	liberal‐humanist	and	late‐modern	forms	of	fiction	to	genre‐based	
novels?	To	what	larger	complex	of	socio‐historical	conditionality	might	this	be	
attributable	as	a	more	general	syndrome?	This	is	by	no	means	an	uninteresting	
question,	and	one	that	Warnes	perhaps	does	not	probe	extensively	enough,	resting	
his	case	on	the	argument	that	“the	postapartheid	crime	thriller	should	be	read	as	
negotiating	–	in	the	ambivalent	sense	of	the	word	–	the	threat	and	uncertainty	that	
many	feel	to	be	part	of	South	African	life,	creating	fantasies	of	control,	restoration	
and	maintenance,	and	reflecting	on	the	circumstances	that	gave	rise	to	this	unease.”9	
Agreed,	but	what	greater	complex	of	circumstance,	both	cultural	and	historical,	
																																																								
7	See	Nuttall,	Entanglement.	
8	Warnes,	“Writing	Crime,”	983.	
9	Warnes,	“Writing	Crime,”	991.	
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long‐	and	short‐term,	underlie	the	“threat	and	uncertainty”	that	Warnes	identifies?	
	
Cultural	Difference	in	a	Postapartheid	Frame	
	
The	argument,	I	believe,	needs	to	commence	with	a	view	of	the	changing	role	of	
cultural	difference	before	and	after	the	political	transition	of	the	1990s.	For	several	
decades	now	postcolonial	theory	in	its	various	forms	has	encouraged	an	emphasis	
on	cultural	difference	as	a	modifier	of	political	subjectivity	and	identitarian	position‐
taking.	More	general	studies	of	cultural	difference	in	its	many	dimensions,	such	as	
those	by	Robert	Young,	Edward	Said,	Gayatri	Spivak,	and	Homi	Bhabha,10	to	name	
only	the	most	obvious,	in	addition	to	South	African‐specific	examples	(Comaroff,	
Attwell,	Brown,	Wylie,	Hofmeyr,	De	Kock,	among	others),11	have	tended	to	place	the	
spotlight	on	the	many	ways	in	which	cultural	difference	has	been	misrecognized,	in	
the	colonies	and	the	Orient,	within	reductive	epistemic	frames	of	reference.	The	
centuries‐long	discourse	around	the	“wild	man,”12	primitivism,	exoticism	and	other	
categorical	impositions,	including	the	fixations	of	social‐Darwinist	thought	and	
biological	racism,13	found	a	trenchant	rebuttal	in	postcolonial	theory	and	revisionist	
cultural	history,	most	emphatically	perhaps	in	Orientalism,	and	stretching	beyond	
literary	and	cultural	criticism	to	empirically‐founded	historical	works	of	epistemic	
redress	such	as	Dipesh	Chakrabarty’s	Provincializing	Europe.	Just	about	every	one	of	
J.M.	Coetzee’s	South	African	novels	implicitly	deals	with	the	politics	of	cultural	
difference	in	one	way	or	another.	Ditto	Nadine	Gordimer	and	the	legions	of	lower‐
ranked	South	African	novelists	working	in	the	pre‐2000	period.	I	think	it	is	fair	to	
say	that	a	common	strain	in	such	work	has	been	the	sense	that	cultural	difference	
has	been	mismanaged	in	both	colonial	and	neocolonial	contexts,	not	to	mention	
																																																								
10	Young,	Colonial	Desire;	White	Mytholgies;	Said,	Orientalism;	Spivak,	In	Other	Worlds;	and	Bhabha,	
The	Location	of	Culture.	
11	Comaroff,	Jean	and	John.	Of	Revelation	and	Revolution;	Attwell,	Rewriting	Modernity;	Brown,	
Voicing	the	Text;	Wylie,	Savage	Delight,	Hofmeyr,	“We	Spend	Our	Years”;	De	Kock,	Civilising	
Barbarians.	
12	See	Dietrich,	Of	Salvation	and	Civilisation.	
13	Dubow,	Scientific	Racism.	
	 8
neoliberal	conditions,	and	that	vigilance	about	more	equitable	recognition	of	all	
forms	of	difference	–	in	sexuality,	race,	ethnicity,	language,	culture	and	the	episteme	
–	remains	an	important	ethical	task.	It	is	also	fair	to	suggest	that	South	Africa’s	
“negotiated	revolution,”	culminating	in	a	transition	to	majority	rule	and	broad‐
based	democracy	in	1994,	set	in	place	(at	least	in	the	formal	superstructure	of	the	
law	and	the	Constitution)	a	remediation	of	the	evils	of	earlier	negations	of	
difference.	By	1994,	racial	discrimination	and	the	mismanagement	of	difference	(a	
kind	of	distorted	or	“bad”	difference,	such	as	apartheid’s	“separate	but	equal”	alibi	
for	white	rule)	came	to	be	seen	by	all	except	the	lunatic‐fringe	far	right	as	a	
universal	evil,	as	the	very	subject	of	evil.	By	this	time,	apartheid,	solidly	based	on	the	
segregationist	foundation	laid	by	more	than	three	centuries	of	colonialism,	had	been	
declared	a	crime	against	humanity;	now,	after	the	advent	of	full	democracy,	even	the	
insiders	of	apartheid,	the	mollycoddled	whites,	were	persuaded	to	accept	that	
“rainbowism”	–	a	symbolic	figuration	of	“good”	or	equitable	cultural	difference	
peculiar	to	South	Africa’s	late	revolution	–	was	a	virtuous	political	and	social	state	of	
being.	For	a	short	while	during	President	Nelson	Mandela’s	five	years	of	honeymoon	
rule,	“rainbowism”	was	enthusiastically	embraced,	not	least	by	Archbishop	
Desmond	Tutu	and	Mandela	himself,	who	will	be	remembered,	among	other	things,	
for	having	tea,	in	the	white	“homeland”	of	Orania,	with	Betsy	Verwoerd,	widow	of	
apartheid’s	architect,	Dr	Hendrik	Frensch	Verwoerd.		
	 The	cultural‐difference	rainbow,	in	its	honeymoon	phase,	was	not	to	last,	as	
everyone	now	knows.	Any	number	of	accounts,	both	scholarly	and	imaginative,	will	
show	that,	starting	around	the	ANC’s	second	term	of	government	in	1999	and	the	
ascension	to	the	presidency	of	the	distant,	less	conciliatory	Thabo	Mbeki,	a	
pervasive	current	of	disillusionment	set	in.	This	occurred	amid	widespread	
perceptions	of	1)	the	consolidation	of	a	neoliberal	form	of	“class	apartheid”	in	what	
political	economist	Patrick	Bond	calls	a	“choiceless	democracy”14	and	2)	an	
emerging	political	discourse	which	was	newly	race‐accentuated	to	a	degree	that	
dedicated	non‐racialists	both	inside	and	outside	the	ANC	found	uncomfortable.	One	
																																																								
14	Bond,	Patrick,	“Mandela	Years.”	
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example	of	the	new	focus	on	race	–	particularly	the	valorization	of	“pure”	blackness	
above	other	ethnic	colorations	–	was	the	controversy	over	the	Mbeki‐supported	
“Native	Club,”15	which	was	part	of	a	bigger	pattern	that	Finlay	describes	as	typifying	
the	Mbeki	presidency	of	1999‐2008:	“[A]	polarity	in	public	exchanges	dealing	with	
race	that,	for	many,	felt	quite	different	from	the	spirit	of	the	preceding	period,	where	
notions	of	non‐racialism	and	inclusivity	were	the	guiding	ideology	of	state	decision	
and	the	zeitgeist	of	public	discussion.”16	To	the	ire	of	many	longstanding	non‐
racialists,	the	ominously	named	Native	Club,	closely	affiliated	with	President	
Mbeki’s	office,	was	open	to	black	intellectuals	only.	Such	exclusionary	discourse	and	
practice	was	widely	perceived	during	Mbeki’s	reign	to	signal	the	emergence	of	an	
unwelcome,	ugly	racial	essentialism,	re‐enshrined	from	above	in	the	South	African	
body	public.	This	was	seen	as	abrogating	the	traditions	of	non‐racialism	for	which	
the	ANC	fought,	themselves	regarded	as	immemorial	values	(non‐racialism	was	
enshrined	as	a	key	principle	in	the	ANC’s	1955	Freedom	Charter).	It	was	felt	that	
here,	once	again,	a	single	race	among	many	was	being	valorized	as	primary,	as	a	
more	privileged	category;	cultural	difference	was	yet	again	in	danger	of	being	
mismanaged	to	the	benefit	of	one	strain	or	accent	above	others.	The	specter	of	a	
resuscitated	variant	of	“bad	difference,”	an	exclusionary	delineation	of	preferment,	
and	the	hardening	of	such	an	ugly	scab	on	the	body	of	the	“new”	South	Africa,	galled	
many	South	African	libertarians.	Not	least	among	such	perceived	defacements	of	the	
rainbow	ideal	of	freedom	and	equality	amid	diversity	were	the	neoliberal	economic	
policies	which,	combined	with	publicly	proved	state	corruption,	were	creating	
receptive	conditions	for	what	Bond	has	more	recently	has	called	the	“crony‐
capitalist,	corruption‐riddled,	brutally‐securitised,	eco‐destructive	and	anti‐
egalitarian	regime	[South	Africa]	suffer[s]	now.”17	
Bond’s	far‐left	version	of	events	is,	of	course,	is	one	strand	in	a	widely	told	
story	about	what	went	“wrong”	in	South	Africa’s	transition	to	democracy.	However,	
the	fact	that	public	discourse	found	strong	traction	in	the	2000s	on	the	basis	of	a	
																																																								
15		See	Ndlovu‐Gatsheni,	Tracking	the	Historical	Roots;	Finlay,	“Staging	Performance.”	
16	Finlay,	“Staging	Performance,”	36.	
17	Bond,	“Mandela	Years.”	
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widely	held	feeling	that	democracy	was	“failing,”	and	that	it	was	on	the	brink	(see,	
for	example,	Xolela	Mangcu’s	To	the	Brink),	can	be	illustrated	by	a	major	University	
of	the	Witwatersrand	conference	in	January	2008	called	“Paradoxes	of	the	
Postcolonial	Public	Sphere:	Democracy	at	the	Crossroads.”	At	this	gathering,	
political	analysts	Ivor	Chipkin	and	Mangcu,	among	others,	sounded	warnings	about	
a	disturbingly	race‐inflected	narrative	of	“national	identity”	that	seemed	to	be	
increasingly	normative,	and	exclusionary	on	a	racial	basis,	in	the	ranks	of	the	
governing	party.	In	his	book,	Mangcu	critiques	what	he	describes	as	the	“racial	
nationalism”	of	the	Mbeki	government,	calling	for	a	renewed	acceptance	of	
“irreducible	plurality”	and	a	return	to	the	traditions	of	non‐racialism.18	More	
broadly	speaking,	such	Mbeki‐era	“racial	nativism”19	hit	home	with	an	especially	
sick	thud	for	South	African	cultural	and	political	analysts.	Like	Homi	Bhabha	and	his	
fellow	postcolonial	thinkers	in	the	volume	Nation	and	Narration,	many	observers	
had	come	to	regard	restrictive	identikits	for	essentialized	versions	of	“national	
identity”	as	counter	to	progress	made	in	critical	theory	since	the	1968	revolution.	
The	assumption	could	now	no	longer	be	held	that	the	“new”	South	Africa	was	on	
board	in	the	larger,	progressive	project	of	deterritorializing	hegemonic	and/or	
foundational	fixations	of	subjectivity	and	identity,	a	global	hobgoblin.	This	is	not	to	
mention	the	bad	taste	such	a	return	to	ethnic	fixations	left	in	the	mouth	of	those	
who	had	read	Fanon	and	saw	in	the	ugly	re‐birth	of	racial	contractions	of	power	and	
privilege	the	specter	of	corrupt	ruling	elites	who	were	wont	to	lose	the	plot	of	their	
own	revolution.		
It	is	not	my	purpose	here	to	test	and	probe	such	positions	or	their	antecedent	
historical	conditions	per	se,	but	to	note	the	resurgence	of	public‐sphere	alarm	about	
new	orthodoxies	of	national	identity,	and	new	forms	of	“bad”	difference.	Such	
excrescences	were	perceived	to	be	in	stark	contradiction	to	the	promise	of	the	
negotiated	South	African	revolution,	with	its	popularly	celebrated	“rainbowism,”	
regardless	of	frequent	mockery	among	the	intelligentsia	of	“rainbow”	delusions.	At	
																																																								
18	Mangcu,	To	the	Brink,	119.	
19	Mangcu,	To	the	Brink,	37.	
	 11
the	time	of	writing,	another	five	years	after	the	demise	of	Mbeki,	in	the	era	of	Zuma	
and	“Nkandlagate,”20	it	is	common	cause	among	intellectuals,	journalists	and	
analysts	of	almost	every	persuasion	in	South	Africa	(apart	from	government	
spokespeople)	that	the	democratic	ideal	in	South	Africa	has	been	compromised	by	
agents	of	self‐enrichment	and	public‐sphere	corruption.	This	condition	has	
culminated	in	what	is	perceived	as	a	system	of	patrimonialism	with	Jacob	Zuma	at	
its	narrow	apex.	“Bad”	difference	would	appear	once	again	to	be	ruling	the	roost,	at	
least	to	some	extent.	 
To	illustrate	the	point,	consider	the	words	of	renowned	scholar	and	noted	
Johannesburg	resident	Achille	Mbembe	in	a	2013	commentary	in	the	South	African	
Mail	&	Guardian,	which	includes	the	following	ominous	description	of	the	state	of	
the	country:		
South	Africa	has	entered	a	new	period	of	its	history:	a	post‐Machiavellian	moment	
when	private	accumulation	no	longer	happens	through	outright	dispossession	but	
through	the	capture	and	appropriation	of	public	resources,	the	modulation	of	
brutality	and	the	instrumentalisation	of	disorder.21		
For	Mbembe,	South	Africa	in	2013	is	not	immune	from	what	he	calls	a	“mixture	of	
clientelism,	nepotism	and	prebendalism”	common	in	African	postcolonies,	and	he	
warns	that	an	“armed	society”	such	as	South	Africa	is	“hardly	a	democracy;”	it	is,	he	
writes,	“mostly	an	assemblage	of	atomised	individuals	isolated	before	power,	
separated	from	each	other	by	fear,	prejudice,	mistrust	and	suspicion,	and	prone	to	
mobilise	under	the	banner	of	either	a	mob,	a	clique	or	a	militia	rather	than	an	idea	
and,	even	less	so,	a	disciplined	organization.”22	
	
‘Bad’	Difference	–	a	New	‘Axis	of	Evil’?	
	
Again,	my	purpose	here	is	not	to	develop,	contradict	or	validate	arguments	for	and	
																																																								
20	On	Nkandlagate,	see	for	example	David	Smith,	“Jacob	Zuma	Accused	of	Corruption,”	The	Guardian,	
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/29/jacob‐zuma‐accused‐corruption‐south‐africa.		
21	Mbembe,	“Our	Lust	for	Lost	Segregation.”	
22	Ibid.	
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against	such	readings	of	the	country’s	political	management,	suggestive	as	they	are	
of	a	revolution	that	has	lost	its	moorings.	It	is,	rather,	to	ask	a	question	that	follows	
from	such	perceptions	and	readings.	The	question	relates	to	the	writing	of	the	
transition	period	and	beyond,	in	which,	as	I	have	already	noted,	the	turn	towards	
“crime”	stories	is	accompanied	by	an	accelerated	sense	of	alarm	about	“crime”	and	
disorder	in	the	public	body	itself.	The	new	wave	of	fiction,	I	argue	in	this	article,	
works	on	the	hunch	that	a	freshly	perverse	form	of	officially	legitimated	“bad”	
cultural	difference	has	become	an	alibi	for	civil	mismanagement,	perhaps	even	for	
what	Mbembe,	above,	calls	the	“instrumentalisation	of	disorder”.	“Bad”	difference	is	
coming	to	be	perceived	as	a	new	“axis	of	evil”	around	which	social	detection	
persistently	finds	itself	orbiting.	I	propose	that	the	work	of	social	detection,	as	
generically	spun	into	detective	stories	by	a	new	generation	of	writers,	has	become	a	
matter	of	exposing	such	“bad”	difference	and	its	legitimating	rationalizations,	its	
postures	and	alibis,	marking	it	out	as	“off”	(as	in	“good”	meat	that	has	“gone	off”),	
and	identifying	it	as	the	shadow‐side	of	virtuous	or	acceptable	versions	of	legitimate	
cultural	difference.	Such	socially	“conscientising”	writing,	in	Warnes’s	words,23	
seeks	to	show	more	precisely	how	“bad”	difference	goes	about	its	disingenuous	
work.	If	the	“transition”	itself	is	difficult	to	“see,”	and	hard	to	believe,	since	so	little	
appears	to	have	changed	on	the	ground,	in	hard	economic	terms,	especially	for	the	
poor,24	then	such	detection	and	exposure	is	–	almost	naturally	–	the	work	of	the	
writer.	In	such	an	understanding	of	the	writer’s	role,	s/he	seeks	to	show	what’s	
actually	going	on,	or	at	least	to	suggest	a	theory,	a	revised	version	of	the	lost	social	
plot,	in	which	a	calculated	guess	is	made.	The	task	for	the	writer	(and	the	critic),	
then,	is	to	make	the	transition	–	or	the	fiction	of	the	transition	–	visible	and	tractable	
by	plotting	its	characters,	their	sphere	of	operation,	their	motives	and	modus	
operandi,	and	ultimately,	their	deeds	and	the	social	meaning	thereof.	Political	
operatives	who	were	“good”	in	the	past,	under	conditions	of	disenfranchisement,	
now	often	become	“bad”	bearers	of	power.	At	least,	this	would	often	appear	to	be	
																																																								
23	Warnes,	“Writing	Crime,”	983.	
24	See	Bond,	Elite	Transition;	Allen,	Transformation	in	South	Africa.	
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the	real,	hidden	meaning	of	the	transition	as	construed	by	crime	writers.25	Power	is	
seen	as	an	ineluctably	a	motor	of	corruption,	and	ultimately	the	turning	point	in	any	
scenario	of	“good”	and	“bad”	difference.	The	implicit	question	is:	Does	the	country,	
inexplicably	beset	with	renewed	violence	and	perverse	social	manifestations	of	
disorder,	still	know	itself	–	that	is,	if	it	ever	did?	The	answer,	it	seems,	is	dubious,	to	
say	the	least.26	
The	distinction	between	faux‐difference	and	the	real	deal	might	be	seen	in	
the	following	terms:	political	and	cultural	difference	as	validated	by	the	Constitution	
suggests	a	relation	of	symmetry	in	which	the	parts	are	relatively	equal	within	the	
whole,	or	at	least	equal	in	relation	to	the	diktat	of	the	Constitution.	“Bad”	or	corrupt	
difference,	on	the	other	hand,	uses	the	legitimizing	politics	of	cultural	difference	as	
an	alibi	for	asymmetrical	gain,	or	gain	at	the	expense	of	others	in	the	vaunted	
constitutional	democracy.	This	is	perceived	as	undermining	the	relation	of	relative	
equality	that	validates	difference	in	the	idealized,	constitutional	sense	in	the	first	
place.	“Bad”	difference	in	this	sense	is	a	form	of	enunciatory	and	material	hypocrisy,	
the	use	of	the	power	afforded	by	constitutional	equality	to	leverage	unequal	
preferment	while	speaking	the	hallowed	ethos	of	egalitarianism.	Performative	or	
enunciatory	rather	than	integral	or	conscientious	cultural	difference	becomes	a	
means	of	social	legitimation,	under	whose	implicit	banner	the	perceived	shuffling	
and	snuffling	at	the	trough	is	seen	to	occur.	Materialist	critics	would	see	this	as	a	
form	of	class	betrayal,	as	Bond	does	in	his	description	of	the	postapartheid	order	as	
“class	apartheid,”27	a	system	in	which	those	speaking	for	the	poor	continue	to	do	so	
while	gaining	assymetrical	capital	leverage	based	on	an	“empowerment‐for‐all”	
ticket.	This	is	precisely	what	the	new	generation	of	Black	Consciousness	proponents	
such	as	Andile	Mngxitsisana	do	in	fact	say	(at	the	time	of	writing,	Mngxitsisana	had	
																																																								
25	See,	for	example,	Nicol’s	“Revenge	Trilogy”	–	Payback	(2008),	Killer	Country	(2010),	and	Black	
Heart	(2011)	–	in	which	this	trend	is	particularly	marked,	along	with	Roger	Smith’s	Mixed	Blood	
(2009)	and	Wake	up	Dead	(2010).	
26	Celebrated	South	African	nonfiction	author	Jonny	Steinberg	in	2013	commented	at	a	seminar	
following	his	award	of	a	Windham	Campbell	Prize	at	Yale	University	that	South	Africa	is	a	country	
where	“writing	is	a	question	of	coordination	between	deaf	people”	(personal	seminar	notes).	
27	Bond,	“Mandela	Years.”	
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joined	his	leader	Julius	Malema	in	Parliament	on	behalf	of	the	Economic	Freedom	
Fighters	(EFF)	political	party).	For	the	crime	writers,	the	existence	of	corrupted	or	
“bad”	difference	is	detected	in	a	range	of	public	and	private	spaces,	from	the	
government	itself	(more	specifically,	its	corrupt	and	hungry	officials	and	their	
cronies,	as	in	Nicol’s	works),	among	the	criminals,	which	often	includes	the	
(degenerate,	sold‐out)	members	of	the	South	African	Police	Services	(as	in	Smith’s	
Mixed	Blood);	or	in	civil	society	itself,	in	which	“bad”	alliances	between	distinct	
subsets	of	the	heterodox	civil	cosmopolis	in	cahoots	with	state	functionaries	create	
diseased	distortions	of	“civil”	practice	(as	in	Margie	Orford’s	Gallows	Hill	and	
Andrew	Brown’s	Refuge).	For	writers	in	the	postapartheid	period,	the	older	and	
perhaps	easier‐to‐define	moral	economy	of	anti‐apartheid	or	struggle	literature	has	
disappeared	for	good.	Now,	they	feel	compelled	to	work	out	a	new	way	of	seeing	
things.	In	this	newer	social	and	moral	economy,	the	boundaries	of	right	and	wrong,	
of	good	and	bad,	have	shifted	decisively,	and	need	to	be	pinpointed	afresh.	Disorder	
and	criminal	violence	have	become	epidemic	and	must	be	addressed.	Of	course,	this	
is	never	going	be	an	easy	task.	The	postapartheid	fictional	terrain,	I	will	argue,	
dramatizes	a	reconfigured	contest	over	law	and	order	in	which	the	borderlines	of	
legitimate	and	illegitimate,	now	far	less	clear	or	identifiable,	are	under	erasure.	
“Crime”	is	so	rife	that	neither	the	state	nor	any	particular	civil	grouping,	it	would	
appear,	has	a	monopoly	over	either	violence	or	legitimacy.	Moral	ambiguity	–	the	
loss	of	stable	political	and	ethical	compass	points	–	proves	to	be	a	ubiquitous	new	
terrain	in	which	“difference”	plays	out	in	these	fictions,	often	revealing,	in	addition	
to	misgovernment	and	criminal	citizenship,	a	gory	inversion	of	the	rule	of	law.		
	
Postcolonial	Law	and	(Dis)order		
	
Harvard‐based	South	African	cultural	anthropologists	Jean	and	John	Comaroff	home	
in	on	precisely	such	ethical	muddiness,	such	profound	moral	ambiguity	and	seeming	
lawlessness,	within	contexts	of	validated	political	difference,	in	two	separate	essays	
in	their	edited	volume,	Law	and	Disorder	in	the	Postcolony	(2006).	Rita	Barnard,	too,	
in	her	essay	“Tsotsis:	On	Law,	the	Outlaw,	and	the	Postcolonial	State”	(2008),	in	
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which	she	discusses	the	Comaroffs	work	in	this	regard,	draws	attention	to	the	
manner	in	which	the	postapartheid	state	has	brought	with	it	“new	patterns	of	
inclusion	and	exclusion,	new	meanings	of	citizenship,	and	new	dimensions	of	
sovereignty	and	power.”28	One	aspect	of	this	newer	set‐up,	according	to	Barnard,	is	
that	“minimal	government,	under	pressure	from	a	frightened	citizenry	(redefined	as	
consumers	and	victims),	can	readily	turn	into	its	authoritarian	opposite.”29	For	the	
Comaroffs,	the	former	colonial	state	evinces	a	particular	preoccupation	with	the	law,	
amounting	at	times	to	a	fetishization	of	legality.	The	preoccupation	with	law	and	
legality,	write	the	Comaroffs,	runs	deeper	than	“purely	a	concern	with	crime.”30	This	
is	an	important	point	to	make,	since	“crime”	in	South	African	discourse	is	a	
problematic	signifier,	capturing	very	incompletely	the	more	generalized	scene	of	
social	instability.	It	has	to	do,	the	Comaroffs	argue,	“with	the	very	constitution	of	the	
postcolonial	polity,”	since	the	“modernist	nation‐state	appears	to	be	undergoing	an	
epochal	move	away	from	the	ideal	of	an	imagined	community	founded	on	the	fiction,	
often	violently	sustained,	of	cultural	homogeneity,	toward	a	nervous,	xenophobically	
tainted	sense	of	heterogeneity	and	heterodoxy.”31	The	rise	of	neoliberalism,	the	
authors	continue,	“has	heightened	all	this,	with	its	impact	on	population	
movements,	on	the	migration	of	work	and	workers,	on	the	dispersion	of	cultural	
practices,	on	the	return	of	the	colonial	oppressed	to	haunt	the	cosmopoles	that	once	
ruled	them	and	wrote	their	histories.”		Such	effects	“are	felt	especially	in	former	
colonies,	which	were	erected	from	the	first	on	difference.”32		
Now,	difference	comes	back	to	haunt	the	former	colonies:	“[P]ostcolonials	
are	citizens	for	whom	polymorphous,	labile	identities	coexist	in	uneasy	ensembles	
of	political	subjectivity;”	such	citizens	tend	not	to	attach	their	sense	of	destiny	to	the	
nation,	but	rather	to	“an	ethnic,	cultural,	language,	religious,	or	some	other	group,”	
despite	the	fact	that	subjects	such	as	these	do	not	necessarily	reject	their	national	
																																																								
28	Barnard,	“Tsotsis,”	561‐562.	See	also	Johnny	Steinberg,	“Crime”.	
29	Ibid.,	565.	
30	Comaroff,	Law	and	Disorder,	32.	
31	Ibid.,	32.	
32	Ibid.,	33	
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identity.33	What	are	often	labeled	as	communal	loyalties	(vide	Pagad	in	the	Western	
Cape,	for	example,	or	migrants	from	other	parts	of	Africa	who	have	been	the	subject	
of	xenophobic	attacks	in	Johannesburg	and	elsewhere),	“are	frequently	blamed	for	
the	kinds	of	violence,	nepotism,	and	corruption	said	to	saturate	these	societies,	as	if	
cultures	of	heterodoxy	bear	within	them	the	seeds	of	criminality,	difference,	
disorder.”	34	
It	is	worth	cycling	back	a	little	to	give	a	more	complete	account	of	how	the	
Comaroffs	get	to	the	rather	startling	point	that	it	is	within	cultures	of	heterodoxy		
that	criminality	and	disorder	are	seen	as	correlates	of	difference.	How	has	it	come	
about	that	the	role	of	cultural	difference,	such	a	critical	factor	in	the	history	of	many	
postcolonies,	could	have	shifted	so	drastically,	and	so	alarmingly,	from	a	virtue	to	
something	resembling	a	matrix	for	criminality?	
	 The	first	step	is	to	sketch	the	context	in	which	such	a	keen	preoccupation	
with	the	law,	legality	and	its	abrogation	in	the	postcolony	might	be	found,	since	one	
of	its	most	recent	examples	is	surely	postapartheid	South	Africa.	Drawing	on	a	wide	
range	of	case	studies	and	ethnographic	scholarship,	the	Comaroffs	find	that	“law	and	
disorder”	are	constitutive	of	a	social	base	in	which	legality	and	criminality	depend	
on	and	feed	off	each	other	in	an	enhanced,	or	accentuated,	manner.	The	Comaroffs	
note	that	“vastly	lucrative	returns	…	inhere	in	actively	sustaining	zones	of	ambiguity	
between	the	presence	and	absence	of	the	law;”	in	this	way,	value	is	amassed	“by	
exploiting	the	new	aporias	of	jurisdiction	opened	up	by	neoliberal	conditions.”35		
	
Central	to	the	Comaroffs’	discussion	about	the	consequences	of	neoliberal	
political	rationality	in	the	postcolony	is	not	only	what	one	might	call	on‐the‐ground	
conditions	of	“lawlessness”	behind	value‐amassing	grabs,	but	also	the	widespread	
media	representation	of	such	conditions	as	“bad.”	These	media	versions	of	what	
might	be	styled	as	a	kind	of	grab‐what‐you‐can‐while‐you‐can	approach	to	the	“free	
																																																								
33	Ibid.	
34	Ibid.	
35		Comaroff,	Law	and	Disorder,	5.	
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market”	take	their	lead	from	an	older,	more	equitable	liberal	rationality.	Egalitarian	
political	theory	in	South	Africa,	I	would	add,	embedded	in	an	idealistic	(and	classic	
liberal‐democratic)	Constitution,	exists	in	a	state	of	fundamental	disjuncture	with	
socioeconomic	practice,	as	observed	and	reported	upon	frenetically	in	the	real	
world	of	everyday	media.	The	conjunction	of	“neo”	and	“liberal”	creates	a	
paradoxical	nexus	in	which	it	is	possible	both	to	be	willy‐nilly	part	of	such	an	order	
and	to	work	against	its	grain,	whether	corruptly	(as	in	police	commissioners	who	
take	bribes	but	profess	to	uphold	the	law)	or	from	a	position	of	genuine	entrapment	
as	a	subject	in	such	an	order	of	things.	The	crime	writer	often	takes	up	the	position,	
on	behalf	of	an	entrapped	citizenry,	of	the	galled	civil	subject	observing	dirty	doings	
in	a	newly	created	“democratic”	order	that	seems	to	belie	in	its	(reported)	behavior	
every	tenet	of	its	underlying	(liberal‐democratic)	ethos.	Further,	in	the	more	
reflexive	writers’	work,	there	is	an	awareness	that	the	citizen	so	entrapped	in	
observing	widespread	neoliberal	quashing	of	classic	liberalism	is	also	willy‐nilly	
part	of	the	same	system.	This	kind	of	tension	between	an	idealized	notion	of	(fair)	
legality	that	is	consistently	invoked	as	a	leitmotif,	and	its	persistent	cancelling	by	
(unfair)	practice	parading	as	differential	empowerment,	is	typical	of	the	
postcolonial	law/disorder	condition	described	by	the	Comaroffs.	
Ironically,	in	such	conditions	law	is	fetishized,	“even	as,	in	most	postcolonies,	
higher	and	higher	walls	are	built	to	protect	the	propertied	from	lawlessness,	even	as	
the	language	of	legality	insinuates	itself	deeper	and	deeper	into	the	realm	of	the	
illicit.”36	Law	and	lawlessness,	assert	the	Comaroffs,	“are	conditions	of	each	other’s	
possibility.”37	And	so,	too,	are	these	two	leitmotifs	of	the	postcolony	inextricably	
bound	in	fictive	imaginaries:	“Mass	mediation,”	write	the	Comaroffs,	quoting	
Rosalind	Morris,	“gives	law	and	disorder	a	‘communicative	force’	that	permits	it	to	
‘traverse	the	social	field’.”38	These	arguments	appear	to	support	Margie	Orford’s	
																																																								
36	Ibid.,	22.	
37	Ibid.,	21.	
38	Ibid.	
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public	views39	that	crime	fiction	allows	ordinary	citizens	imaginatively	to	traverse	
zones	of	law	and	its	scrubbing	out	which	are	not	generally	seen	except	by	policemen	
and	journalists;	the	“crime”	story	is	thus	a	“communicative	force”	in	which	bolted‐in,	
apprehensive	citizens	of	the	neoliberal	postcolony	can	“get	out”	and	“see”	what	
might	actually	be	going	on	in	the	dark	of	night,	and	in	the	clear	light	of	day,	too,	in	
the	frequently	bewildering,	unreadable	postapartheid	topography.	
	 Morris	comments	on	the	pervasive	phenomenon	of	mediated	“crime”	in	
South	Africa:	“Transmitted	along	a	myriad	vectors,	in	televisual	serials,	newspaper	
columns,	radio	broadcasts,	and	music	lyrics,	crime	is	the	phantom	that	haunts	the	
new	nation’s	imaginary.”40	Crime	is	both	an	event	in	the	real	world	and	a	mediated	
condition	feeding	other	fears	and	insecurities:	“Macabre	tales	of	heavily	armed	
robbers	and	single‐minded	carjackers,	of	remorseless	murderers,	and	–	most	
remarked	of	all	–	pedophilic	rapists	feed	a	national	press	that	is	insatiable	for	news	
of	personalized	catastrophe	with	which	to	signify	or	prophesy	political	failure.”41	
Similarly,	historian	Gary	Kynoch42	argues	for	a	deep	preoccupation	among	whites	in	
South	Africa	in	the	postapartheid	period	with	narratives	of	lawlessness	amid	
mounting	political	suspense.		
‘Crime’	as	an	Allegory	for	the	Sociopolitical	
Understanding,	interpreting,	describing	and	responding	to	“crime”	in	the	“new”	
South	Africa	therefore	appears	to	be	an	everyday	allegory	for	the	sociopolitical	
terrain	in	a	broad	sense,	speaking	urgently	to	anxieties	about	very	real	conditions	of	
social	disorder.43	“[T]he	causes	of	crime’s	transformation	are	…	usually	construed	in	
																																																								
39	See	Orford’s	comment	in	De	Kock,	Leon.	“Roger	Smith	and	the	‘Genre	Snob’	Debate.”	SLiPnet,	
http://slipnet.co.za/view/reviews/crime‐fiction‐the‐%E2%80%98new‐political‐
novel%E2%80%99/			
40	Morris,		“The	Mute	and	the	Unspeakable”,	61.	
41	Ibid.,	61.	
42	Kynoch,	“Fear	and	Alienation”.	
43	On	forms	of	“allegory”	in	this	sense,	see	also	Rita	Barnard’s	insightful	discussion	of	the	film	version	
of	Fugard’s	Tsotsi.	
	 19
political	terms,”	argues	Morris;	“[c]rime	marks	the	boundary	of	the	polis	as	much	as	
any	other	wilderness,”	she	adds.44	Within	such	a	sociopolitical	milieu,	regardless	of	
finer	points	of	form,	genre	or	the	writer’s	intention,	writers	ineluctably	go	to	the	
heart	of	the	political	with	every	new	narrative	in	which	detection	is	imagined	as	a	
set	of	explorations	across	the	social	terrain,	and	the	cause	of	a	crime	is	sought	
within	a	chain	of	events	in	the	kind	of	polity	described	above.		
	 Of	course,	many	shades	of	the	palette	will	be	evident	as	writers	seek	to	depict	
an	emerging	order	through	the	lens	of	what	a	community	deems	to	be	“criminal,”	in	
line	with	classical	sociologist	Emile	Durkheim’s	credo	that	society	learns	to	know	
itself	by	coming	to	understand	the	nature	its	own	criminal	shadow.	For	Durkheim,	
crime	–	and	more	to	the	point,	how	people	respond	to	its	occurrence	–	provides	a	
basis	for	the	emergence	of	a	normative	consensus.	“Crime	brings	together	upright	
consciences	and	concentrates	them,”	Durkheim	wrote	in	the	late	19th	century,45	and	
this	continues	to	hold	true.	The	problem	for	South	African	writers	on	the	cusp	of	the	
20th	century,	however,	has	often	been	the	very	equivocality	–	and	contestation	–	of	
the	line	between	legality	and	criminality,	both	in	the	civil	and	in	the	public,	or	
governmental,	sphere.	The	condition	of	“plot	loss”	for	such	writers	is	acute:	not	only	
has	the	sociopolitical	dispensation	at	“home”	changed	fundamentally,	making	what	
in	the	very	recent	past	was	illegal	and	wrong	suddenly	legal	and	right,	and	vice‐
versa;	world	politics,	too,	have	undergone	a	disorienting	transformation.	In	the	
1990s,	leading	into	the	new	millennium	and	beyond,	these	two	formerly	far	more	
discrete	zones	(“home”	and	“outside”	world)	began	to	play	into	each	other	such	that	
new	levels	of	uncertainty	would	bedevil	the	projected	relief	at	achieving	a	
democratic	consensus	in	the	South	African	body	politic	at	large.	In	the	wake	of	
globalization	and	its	dramatic	1990s	upsurge,	the	rules	had	been	rewritten	across	
the	transformed	face	of	the	world,	especially	for	nations	that	for	so	long	had	defined	
themselves	in	relation	to	the	antagonisms	of	the	Cold	War.		
																																																								
44	Morris,	“The	Mute	and	the	Unspeakable,”	61.	
45	Durkheim,	The	Divison	of	Labor,	103.	
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	 Leading	crime	novelist	of	the	South	African	transition	Deon	Meyer	takes	
precisely	the	disambiguation	of	this	complex	condition	as	his	implicit	task,	his	
subtext,	in	the	“crime”	novel	Heart	of	the	Hunter.	Meyer’s	hero	in	this	tale,	the	
muscled	modern	warrior	Thobela	(“Tiny”)	Mpayipheli,	allegorically	embodies	the	
intricate	complexity	of	the	postapartheid	dispensation	in	several	ways.	Not	only	was	
Mpayipheli	schooled	in	Cold	War	conditions	as	an	MK	soldier	trained	in	Eastern	
Europe	under	Communist	conditions;	not	only	was	he	“forgotten”	by	the	now‐ruling	
ANC	upon	his	return	from	exile	(as	many	have	been);	he	was	also	“shopped”	as	a	
crack	assassin	to	the	eastern	Europeans	in	return	for	much‐needed	political	capital.	
Then,	to	make	matters	worse,	this	Xhosa	“hunter‐warrior”	–	associated	explicitly	in	
the	text	with	a	line	of	immemorial	pre‐colonial	champions	including	Phalo,	Maqoma	
and	Ngqika	–	is	abandoned	by	the	Eastern	Europeans	after	the	fall	of	the	Berlin	Wall.	
They	had	been	using	him	as	an	unusually	sharp	Cold	War	assassin,	one	who	kills	his	
final	victim	with	a	stabbing	spear.	Importantly,	Meyer’s	multilayered	“plot”	in	this	
novel	is	built	precisely	upon	the	ruins	of	earlier	sociohistorical	plots:	1)	The	ANC’s	
alliance	with	the	USSR	and	the	Communist	world,	which	imploded	on	the	eve	of	
liberation	in	South	Africa,	just	when	it	was	due	to	bear	ultimate	fruit;	2)	The	
promised	economic	“new	deal”	in	South	Africa,	in	consequence	upon	socialism’s	
projected	moral	victory	on	the	world	stage;	this	is	a	deal	that	dramatically	failed	to	
come	about;	Mpayipheli,	committed	foot‐soldier	of	the	revolution,	comes	home	to	
nothing,	neither	glory	nor	money;	3)	The	setting	up	of	a	socialist	democracy	inside	a	
(pre‐globalization)	nation‐state	secured	by	the	liberation	forces	–	yet	another	
conspicuous	failure	of	intention.	All	of	these	building	blocks	for	what	was	long	
projected	as	a	“good”	and	ideologically	virtuous	new	South	Africa	had	been	
precipitously	swept	away.	The	nation‐state’s	ability	to	act	like	a	relatively	
independent	Westphalian	entity,	as	much	in	this	novel	as	in	realpolitik	in	the	1990s	
and	early	2000s,	was	now	being	undermined	to	a	critical	extent	by	the	late‐capitalist	
world	order	and	its	border‐busting	money	and	technological	flows,	spreading	its	
tentacles	even	as	far	as	Moscow	and	the	formerly	“Red”	China.	(Nelson	Mandela	and	
Thabo	Mebki’s	accession	to	the	controversial	“market‐friendly”	policy	for	economic	
growth	and	employment,	“GEAR”,	in	this	period,	is	therefore	also	not	surprising.)	As	
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Allen	concludes	after	a	searching	political‐economic	enquiry,46	the	South	African	
postapartheid	state	found	itself	trapped	between	a	rock	and	a	very	hard	place	as	
global	economic	pressures	increasingly	set	the	agenda	for	any	single	state	–	and	
more	especially	countries	in	the	developing	or	“emerging”	world	–	seeking	to	secure	
economic	growth	and	rising	employment	for	its	citizens.		
	
In	Search	of	the	‘Virtuous’	Postapartheid	Citizen	
	
Meanwhile,	inside	the	“fragile,	infant	democracy”47	that	Heart	of	the	Hunter	maps	in	
the	course	of	its	plot,	matters	are	correspondingly	complicated.	Gone	is	the	old	
struggle	order	of	good	revolutionaries	pitted	against	bad	white	politicians,	or	
commendable	Communists	out‐thinking	exploitative	Western	capitalists.	Now,	in	
many	instances,	the	government	is	at	war	with	itself	as	certain	alliance	partners	
push	to	the	left	of	an	unstable	center	and	others,	formerly	rock‐solid	alliance	
partners,	to	the	right;	at	the	same	time,	separately	constituted	intelligence	agencies	
(combining	the	knowledge	regimes	of	the	former	liberation	armies	with	those	of	the	
former	SA	Defence	Force	and	SA	Police)	find	themselves	bitterly	crossing	swords	
with	each	other.	The	collateral	damage	quotient	that	results	from	such	
intergovernmental	feuds	includes	“good”	people	like	the	struggle	hero	Mpayipheli	
himself	and	Miriam,	his	newfound	beloved.	Of	course,	one	need	only	mention	the	
name	Vusi	Pikoli	and	similar	examples	to	find	real‐world	cases	of	such	collateral	
damage.	The	“good,”	as	in	“good	people,”	and	how	to	define	this	in	the	“new	South	
Africa,”	ideologically	speaking,	was	fast	becoming	an	aporetic	category.	And	it	is	this	
black	hole,	this	blind	spot	about	what	exactly	constitutes	a	“good	citizen,”	or	a	
“reasonable	man”	in	legal	parlance,	to	which	both	crime	writers,	nonfiction	authors	
and	political	analysts	have	repeatedly	turned.48		
	 Imaginative	writers	such	as	Meyer,	Margie	Orford,	Kgebetli	Moele,	Nadine	
Gordimer,	Zakes	Mda,	J.M.	Coetzee,	Damon	Galgut,	Fred	Khumalo,	Andrew	Brown,	
																																																								
46	Allen,	Transformation	in	South	Africa,	181‐192.	
47	Meyer,	Heart	of	the	Hunter,	234.	
48	See	Bloom,	Ways	of	Staying;	Altbeker,	Fruit	of	a	Poisoned	Tree;	Chipkin,	Do	South	Africans	Exist?	
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Marlene	van	Niekerk,	Siphiso	Mzobe,	Lisa	Fugard,	Imraan	Coovadia,	Sarah	Penny,	
Diale	Tlholwe,	Sonja	Loots,	Thando	Mgqolozana,	Henrietta	Rose‐Innes,	Niq	Mhlongo,	
Etienne	van	Heerden,	Rachel	Zadok,	Mandla	Langa,	Ingrid	Winterbach,	Eben	Venter,	
Michiel	Heyns,	Angelina	Makholwa,	Heinrich	Troost,	and	still	others	(too	numerous	
to	mention)	at	work	in	this	period	seemed	especially	keen	to	probe	the	problem	of	
the	“virtuous”	individual	–	and	the	limits	or	pressures	brought	to	bear	in	defining	
such	virtue	–	as	a	litmus	test	for	the	health	of	the	social	body	at	large.	Where	does	
one	draw	the	line	between	legitimate	cultural	difference	–	a	polymorphous	good	–	
and	less	ennobling	strains	of	difference?	In	a	fragile	ensemble	of	citizens	trying	to	
make	a	new	democratic	consensus,	“bad	difference”	arguably	introduces	a	strain	of	
polymorphous	perversity,	to	misuse	Freud’s	famous	term.	Coetzee	probed	the	limit‐
conditions	of	democratic	consensus	in	the	character	of	David	Lurie,	and	Gordimer	in	
her	examination	of	the	trigger‐finger	character	in	The	House	Gun,	Duncan	Lingard,	to	
mention	the	two	most	obvious	examples.	Damon	Galgut,	in	The	Good	Doctor,	gives	us	
two	doctors	trying	to	do	the	“right	thing”	in	a	rural	hospital,	against	the	political	
odds,	and	asks	us	to	weight	them	up.49	The	other	authors	mentioned	above	can	be	
shown	to	be	doing	a	similar	exercise	via	different	means	in	each	case.		
How	to	define	a	“good”	person	in	the	“new	South	Africa”	is	also	what’s	
urgently	at	issue	in	Meyer’s	novel.	By	creating	a	single	primary	focus	of	public	
attention	–	a	riveting	road	chase	–	Meyer	succeeds	in	concentrating	the	attention	of	
three	interlocking	sets	of	reading	publics	(his	South	African	readers,	his	sizeable	
international	audience,	and	the	imagined	general‐public	consumers	of	media	
embedded	in	novel’s	plot)	upon	a	critical	question:	is	Tiny	Mpayipheli	a	bad	guy	or	a	
good	guy,	a	hero	or	a	villain?	Is	he	virtuous	or	meretricious	within	the	redefined	
terms	of	moral	good	under	the	new	dispensation?	How	far	do	we	allow	for	
“difference”	in	the	newly	tolerant	constitutional	democracy?	A	“good	citizen”	is	a	
category,	as	Chipkin50	demonstrates,	that	is	under	erasure	in	Meyer’s	“infant	
democracy,”	and	therefore	the	subject	of	feverishly	differential	redefinition.	It	is	a	
																																																								
49	See	Titlestad,	“Allegories	of	White	Masculinity.”	
50	Chipkin,	Do	South	Africans	Exist?,	100.	
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question	on	which	the	fate	of	the	country	hangs,	because	if	South	Africa	gets	this	
definition	wrong,	or	badly	skewed	towards	renewed	injustice	and	“bad	difference,”	
that	is,	discrimination	writ	large,	then	the	“baby”	dispensation	might	just	emerge	
from	the	transition	as	a	beastly	adult.	The	stakes,	therefore,	are	very	high.	
The	political	importance	of	this	moral	fixing	of	a	“good	citizen”	cannot	be	
overestimated.	Such	“fixing”	–	in	the	senses	of	both	stabilizing	as	well	as	correcting	–
implies	a	corrective	and	discursive	re‐territorializing	of	the	new	country,	achieving	
a	next‐to‐impossible	consensual	underpinning.		 
It	is	therefore	no	surprise	that	Meyer	orchestrates	sustained	attention	on	
precisely	the	difficulties	of	moral	and	ethical	compass‐setting.	He	achieves	a	high	
degree	of	narrative	concentration	for	his	intersecting	reading	publics	by	launching	
his	protagonist	Mpayipheli	on	a	movie‐style	motorcycle	chase	from	Cape	Town	to	
northern	Botswana.	By	using	a	such	plot‐heavy	thriller	model,	Meyer	succeeds	in	
doing	what	many	indubitably	estimable,	older‐style	political	writers	often	cannot	do	
in	discursively	heavy	modes:	revivify	the	drama	–	the	big‐screen	sense	of	plot,	the	
wide	range	of	characters	–	in	the	story	of	postapartheid	political	change.		 	
	
A	Frankenstein	or	a	Robin	Hood?	
	
In	consequence,	some	more	detailed	plot	recapitulation	at	this	juncture,	it	is	hoped,	
will	not	be	amiss.	Mpayipheli,	figured	perhaps	a	little	romantically	as	being	in	touch	
with	“the	voices	of	his	ancestors	–	Phalo	and	Rharhabe,	Nqika	and	Maqoma,	the	
great	Xhosa	chiefs,	his	bloodline,	source,	and	refuge”51	–	reluctantly	agrees	to	help	a	
former	struggle	comrade,	Johnny	Kleintjes,	who	is	being	held	hostage	by	unknown	
parties	in	Lusaka	following	an	intelligence	sting.	Mpayipheli	must	take	a	hard	drive	
supposedly	containing	sensitive	information	to	Kleintjes’s	obscure	transnational	
kidnappers	in	the	Zambian	capital	so	that	he	can	secure	his	compatriot’s	freedom.	
Mpayipheli	is	reluctant	to	do	this	–	he	has	bought	a	plot	of	land	in	his	ancestral	
Xhosaland	(Eastern	Cape),	whence	he	wants	to	return	with	his	beloved	Miriam	and	
																																																								
51	Meyer,	Heart	of	the	Hunter,	3.	
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her	son.	He	feels	compelled	to	nurture	and	re‐educate	the	boy	as	a	man	of	the	
people.	Like	the	Al	Pacino	character	Carlito	Brigante	in	the	movie	Carlito’s	Way	
(1993),	Mpayipheli	badly	wants	to	close	down	the	bad	parts	of	his	history,	to	live	
pure	and	straight,	but	the	past	hauls	him	in	for	one	(seemingly)	last	settling	of	
scores.	He	“owes”	Kleintjes	an	unspecified	“struggle”	debt,	and	Mpayipheli	is	nothing	
if	not	a	man	of	his	word,	a	“stand‐up	guy”	in	American	gang‐movie	parlance.	He	
books	a	flight	from	Cape	Town	to	Lusaka,	thinking	he	will	sort	the	business	out	
quickly.	Unknown	to	him,	though,	various,	warring	SA	intelligence	agencies	are	
trailing	him	–	they	also	don’t	quite	know	what’s	going	on,	and	they	want	the	
intelligence	on	the	hard	drive	Mpayipheli	is	carrying	so	they	can	find	out.	When	
agents	try	to	apprehend	him	at	Cape	Town	International	airport,	he	shows	his	
extraordinary	physical	prowess	by	staging	an	unlikely	escape,	exiting	the	airport	
and	eventually	“borrowing”	a	BMW	1200	GS	motorcycle	from	his	place	of	work,	a	
Motorrad	dealership	in	the	Cape	Town	city	bowl.	
	 Mpayipheli,	accustomed	to	riding	a	200cc	Honda	Benly,	finds	himself	
compelled	to	adapt	to	the	brutish	power	of	the	massive	BMW,	almost	wiping	himself	
out	as	he	makes	his	way	onto	the	N1,	the	road	that	leads	north	to	both	Botswana	
and	Zimbabwe,	and	beyond	that,	his	intended	destination	of	Lusaka.	He	knows	that	
the	combined	forces	of	the	SA	Police	Services,	the	SA	National	Defence	Force,	
various	arms	of	the	postapartheid	intelligence	services,	along	with	an	elite	reaction	
unit,	will	soon	be	hunting	him	down.	They	do	this	with	helicopters,	satellite	
surveillance,	roadblocks,	and	an	arsenal	of	arms	fit	to	kill	a	battalion	of	soldiers,	let	
alone	a	solo	fugitive	on	a	motorbike.	When	Cape	Times	reporter	Allison	Healy	gets	
wind	of	the	story,	the	stage	is	set	for	a	media	spectacle	that	(for	the	purposes	of	this	
novel)	concentrates	the	attention	of	significant	portions	of	the	new	nation	on	a	
dramatic	chase,	and	what	it	represents.		
	 In	line	with	the	idea	that	reporters	and	detectives	traverse	social	shadow‐
zones	on	behalf	of	the	citizenry,	and	bring	back	dispatches	on	what’s	actually	going	
on	out	there,	Healy’s	reporting,	along	with	other	media	missives	in	the	novel,	pitted	
against	statements	by	the	state,	signal	a	fierce	public‐sphere	contestation	over	how	
best	to	understand	and	interpret	the	events	“on	the	ground”	regarding	Mpayipheli.	
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The	big	question	is	how	to	“read”	him	–	is	he	a	Frankenstein	of	the	struggle,	as	the	
government	media	communiqués	suggest,	or	a	Robin	Hood,	as	many	civil	subjects	
begin	to	think	during	the	course	of	the	story?	Before	long,	reporter	Healy	is	not	only	
updating	her	“story”	on	a	daily	basis	in	the	Cape	Times	as	she	forges	deeper	and	
further	in	her	work	of	social	detection,	she	is	also	being	interviewed	on	national	TV.	
The	Mpayipheli	affair	becomes	a	media	fanfare,	and	a	test	case,	to	boot:	who	is	more	
truthful,	and	more	“good,”	in	this	sapling	democracy	–	the	government’s	agents	or	
the	individual	that	these	agents	are	hunting	down?	The	resolution	of	this	question	
carries	an	enormous	burden	of	meaning	for	the	health	and	longevity	of	the	
democracy:	if	Mpayipheli	does	turn	out	to	be	a	Robin	Hood,	then	why	is	the	State	so	
intent	on	crushing	him,	and	others	like	him?	Can	the	new	government	be	trusted?	If	
Mpayipheli	is	essentially	an	upstanding	citizen,	then	what	is	being	hidden	from	sight	
and	why?	What	is	on	the	hard	drive	he	is	carrying	on	his	person?	And	how	
important	are	the	consequences	of	such	hiding?		
These	questions	were	especially	important	in	the	early	transition	period	
(roughly	the	first	ten	years),	when	South	Africa	still	loomed	large	in	the	global	
imaginary	as	a	singular	case	of	constitutional,	democratic	success	among	developing	
nations,	a	“miracle,”	indeed.	As	the	German	scholar	Jorn	Rüsen	loudly	expostulated	
at	a	Wits	University	colloquium	in	1998	called	“Living	Difference,”	“[i]t	is	imperative	
for	us	that	you	[the	democratic	transition]	succeed!”52	He	was	reminding	skeptical	
South	African	delegates	how	much	was	at	stake,	not	only	for	South	Africa,	but	also	
for	the	very	possibility	of	constitutional	democracy	in	the	postcolonies	of	the	world.	
Among	the	colloquium	discussants	at	that	event	was	Nancy	Fraser,	for	whom	
Habermas’s	theory	of	public‐sphere	deliberation,	framed	as	it	is	within	
Westphalian‐state	or	“national”	contexts,	as	well	as	Benedict	Anderson’s	notion	of	
nationally	constituted	“imagined	communities,”	no	longer	easily	obtained	in	the	
globalizing,	post‐	and	transnational	sphere.53	South	Africa,	one	might	argue,	was	in	
this	period	caught	amidships,	between	the	stern	of	national	identity	(still	a	major	
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point	of	reference	for	South	Africans	of	all	persuasions)	and	the	bow	of	
globalization,	the	point	at	which	the	SA	ship	was	encountering	the	swells	of	oceanic	
global	interconnection.	
	 On	the	one	hand,	the	very	existence	of	media	contestation	across	various	
public	outlets,	and	between	civil	and	state	subjects	(as	depicted	in	Heart	of	the	
Hunter,	and	as	did	indeed	exist	in	reality),	might	have	suggested	to	Meyer’s	readers	
that	a	nationally	bounded	democratic	public	sphere	is	–	or	was	then	–	on	a	sound	
footing;	the	novel	is	set	in	the	early	2000s,	several	years	before	the	infamous	
Protection	of	State	Information	Bill,	or	“Secrecy	Bill.”	Such	healthy	public‐sphere	
contestation	might	suggest	that	Fraser’s	sense	of	a	sequestered	national	public	
sphere	is	premature	in	the	case	of	South	Africa.	Meyer	is	one	of	the	few	crime	
writers	who,	at	least	in	his	earlier	novels,	of	which	Heart	of	the	Hunter	is	a	good	
example,	evinces	optimism	about	the	new	democracy	and	its	prospects	for	robust	
health.	(He	is	correspondingly	severe	on	the	old	white	renegades	who	continue	
come	out	of	the	woodwork	in	corrupt	new‐era	knavery.)	At	the	same	time,	however,	
the	undercurrent	forces	in	Meyer’s	story,	the	very	factors	precipitating	“plot	loss”	
among	the	state’s	functionaries	–	namely	the	CIA	and	transnational	Muslim	agents	at	
work	in	the	novel’s	“sting”,	alongside	an	intelligence	scam	inside	the	South	African	
security	establishment	–	are	mostly	beyond	the	nation‐state’s	control	and	
awareness.	This	suggests	that	Fraser’s	theory	of	nation‐states	losing	the	luxury	of	an	
efficacious,	bounded	public	sphere	might	be	half‐right	after	all.	In	Meyer’s	novel,	as	
in	many	demonstrable	real‐world	incidents	in	postapartheid	South	Africa,	the	state	
is	itself	too	often	in	the	dark	about	what	exactly	is	going	on	for	comfort;	this	is	
especially	so	in	strategic	instances,	both	with	regard	to	external	undercurrents	and	
internally,	where	its	own	operatives	are	often	provably	at	war	with	each	other,	as	
each	week’s	stories	in	the	news	media	tend	to	suggest.	The	state,	like	its	citizens,	
seems	to	have	lost	the	plot,	and	to	save	face	it	has	to	present	a	unified	front.	In	the	
name	of	“national	security,”	in	this	novel,	it	has	no	choice	but	to	back	the	most	
politic	option	in	the	short	term:	hunt	down	Mpayipheli	so	that	it	can	eliminate	the	
risk	that	the	intelligence	he	is	carrying	will	compromise	its	security,	not	to	mention	
its	increasingly	sensitive	dignity.	In	order	to	do	this,	however,	it	must	fight	a	war	of	
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public	opinion,	and	in	the	process	betray	Mpayipheli,	one	of	its	former	MK	soldier‐
heroes,	painting	him	as	a	psychopathic,	out‐of‐control	renegade.	
	 The	question	of	what	exactly	constitutes	a	virtuous	South	African	–	and	by	
implication,	how	to	distinguish	legitimate	articulations	of	cultural	difference	from	
“bad”	difference	–	is	therefore	a	matter	of	the	highest	importance,	both	inside	this	
novel	and	outside	of	it,	involving	a	searching	exploration	of	contending	values.	
“Virtue”	here	would	include	the	sense	outlined	above	by	the	Comaroffs	of	a	
diagnostic	preoccupation	in	postcolonies	with	the	idea	of	what	makes	a	good	or	
legitimate	legal	subject,	a	preoccupation	which,	they	add,	is	“growing	in	
counterpoint	to,	and	deeply	entailed	in,	the	rise	of	the	felonious	state,	private	
indirect	government,	and	endemic	cultures	of	illegality.”54	It	is	a	counterpoint	that	
has	“come	to	feature	prominently	in	popular	discourses	almost	everywhere,”55	
among	which	one	must	count,	I	would	add,	crime	fiction	of	the	kind	I	am	discussing	
here.	As	governance	“disperses	itself	and	monopolies	over	coercion	fragment,”	the	
Comaroffs	write,	“crime	and	policing	provide	a	rich	repertoire	of	idioms	and	
allegories	with	which	to	address,	imaginatively,	the	nature	of	sovereignty,	justice,	
and	social	order.”56		In	the	process,	the	kind	of	ambiguity	about	right	and	wrong,	
legality	and	its	shadow,	noted	earlier	as	typical	of	life	in	various	postcolonies	and	
developing	nations,	looms	large.	As	if	to	demonstrate	this	very	point,	Meyer’s	
character	Janina	Mentz,	head	of	an	elite	intelligence	unit	set	up	above	several	
existing	(and	warring)	intelligence	structures	in	the	postapartheid	government,	tells	
her	protégé	Tiger	Mazibuko	that	“the	world	ha[s]	become	an	evil	place,	residents	
and	countries	not	knowing	who	[is]	friend	or	foe,	wars	that	[can]	no	longer	be	
fought	with	armies	but	at	the	front	of	secret	rooms,	the	mini‐activities	of	abduction	
and	occupation,	suicide	attacks	and	pipe	bombs.”57		 	
	
‘Intelligence’	in	a	Reconstituted	Public	Sphere		
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57	Meyer,	Heart	of	the	Hunter,	104.	
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Taking	this	theme	a	step	further,	Heart	of	the	Hunter’s	focus	on	wars	of	intelligence	
(both	strategic	state	information/espionage,	and	“sense‐making”	in	an	age	of	
information	overload)	captures	a	crisis	of	old	and	new	methods	of	warfare.	The	old	
methods	included	MK	foot‐soldiers	such	as	Mpayipheli	conducting	guerilla	warfare,	
but	such	subjects	now	suddenly	find	themselves	caught	up	in	an	Information	Age	
meta‐war.	In	this	newer	kind	of	mêlée	the	old	tricks	of	information	and	
disinformation	are	elevated	into	a	knowledge	economy	face‐off,	a	hyper‐data	war	of	
contending	information	regimes	which	claims	human	lives	as	incidental	sacrifices.	
By	the	end	of	Meyer’s	novel,	one	comes	to	understand	that	lives	can	plausibly	be	lost	
in	a	war	of	attrition	around	ownership	and/or	control	of	information	in	and	of	itself,	
despite	the	fact	that	the	data	at	the	center	of	the	dust‐up	might	be	quite	worthless,	
or	even	false,	as	it	turns	out	to	be	in	Heart	of	the	Hunter.	But	just	look	at	what’s	at	
stake:	the	power	to	define	what	is	“right,”	and	what	is	legitimate	(including	what	is	
legally	right)	in	the	name	of	the	body	politic.	Therein	lies	the	key	to	the	
knowledge/power	equation,	whether	the	outcome	is	Machiavellian	or	Mandelian.	
Everything,	in	a	sense,	depends	on	“intelligence,”	the	fight	for	which	in	several	
senses	drives	Meyer’s	novel	on	relentlessly	towards	its	materially	bloody	
conclusion.		
	 In	the	plot	of	Heart	of	the	Hunter,	government	agents	issue	communiqués	
describing	Mpayipheli	as	a	deranged	madman,	based	on	the	evidence	of	a	high‐
ranking	former	MK	“hero”	who	makes	this	statement	to	loosen	the	noose	of	a	sexual	
harassment	rap.	Meanwhile,	reporter	Allison	Healy	portrays	a	very	different	version	
of	Mpayipheli	to	her	readers:	he	was	an	old	MK	hero	of	great	distinction,	and	he	has	
repeatedly	tried	to	avoid	hurting	people	in	the	hunt‐and‐resistance	story	occurring	
in	the	novel.	Healy’s	version	of	Mpayipheli	is	also	based	on	the	testimony	of	a	former	
comrade.	In	addition,	the	word	of	more	ordinary	people,	such	as	Mpayipheli’s	
common‐law	wife	Miriam	and	a	streetwise	shoeshine‐man	who	has	known	him	for	
many	years,	suggest	to	Allison	and	her	readers	that	Mapyipheli	is	indeed	a	man	of	
the	people	rather	than	the	villain	the	state	wishes	to	make	him	appear	in	the	eyes	of	
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the	masses.	“Will	the	real	Thobela	Mpayipheli	please	stand	up,”58	Healy	ruminates,	
echoing	the	bigger	question	underlying	the	political	subtext	of	the	novel.	While	the	
makings	of	political	virtue	are	strongly	suggested	in	the	character	of	Koos	Kok,	a	
“Griqua	troubadour”	who	helps	Mpayipheli	escape	the	state’s	helicopters	(Kok	is	
working	with	musician	David	Kramer,	describing	himself	as	a	“skeefbroer”),	the	
country	at	large	remains	in	doubt.	Both	the	motorcycle	chase	and	its	reported	
progress	serve	to	emphasize	that	the	line	between	law	and	(dis)order	cannot	be	
decisively	demarcated.	In	addition,	it	reveals	a	political	cartography	that	is	both	
politically	occulted	and	dangerously	labile.	
	 In	the	end,	the	novelistic	resolution	is	polyvalent	and	disorienting.	
Mpayipheli	loses	his	common‐law	wife	as	a	result	of	a	blunder	by	a	state	security	
agent,	but	he	recovers	the	boy,	planning	to	take	Pakamile	away	with	him	to	his	
ancestral	plot	of	land	in	Xhosaland.	This	is	his	consolation	after	very	nearly	dying	
himself	at	the	hands	of	his	former	comrades.	However,	the	state	of	public	opinion	
about	whether	Mapyipheli	is	a	noble	or	a	debased	citizen	remains	ambiguous.	For	
Meyer,	at	this	point	in	his	career,	and	for	many	writers	like	him,	the	“new”	South	
Africa	refuses	to	resolve	itself	except	in	perversions	of	liberality,	fairness	and	safety,	
especially	in	violations	against	the	intended	inheritors	of	the	revolution.	
	
Conclusion	
	
This	article	has	demonstrated	how	cultural	difference	acts	as	a	locus	for	a	
transformed	and	redefined	moral	economy	in	the	postapartheid	public	imaginary,	in	
the	media,	in	scholarship,	and	in	the	communicatively	powerful	form	of	popular	
crime	fiction.	This	convergence	points	to	a	disparately	effected	but	keen	perception	
of	a	reconfigured	postapartheid	“axis	of	evil,”	one	which	coincides	to	some	extent	
with	a	more	general	postcolonial	and	global	condition	in	the	wake	of	neoliberal	
hegemony	across	the	world.	Whereas	the	denigration	of	cultural	difference	(in	
colonial	and	neocolonial	contexts)	once	mobilized	concerted	activism	for	its	re‐
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validation	and	the	restoration	of	putatively	more	symmetrical	power	relations,	a	
widespread	emergence	of	“bad”	difference,	instantiated	in	the	phenomenon	of	the	
“Felonious	State,”	has	seen	a	profound	lack	of	clarity	on	matters	of	right	and	wrong,	
legality	and	illegality,	virtuous	citizenry	and	political	(il)legitimacy.	Right	or	wrong	
uses	of	violence,	too,	have	become	less	easy	to	identify,	as	fictionally	dramatized	the	
case	of	Thobela	Mpayipheli	in	Meyer’s	Heart	of	the	Hunter	(and	its	sequel,	Devil’s	
Peak).	In	Devil’s	Peak,	Mpayipheli	finds	himself	to	resorting	to	rough	justice	with	his	
assegai	for	pedophiles	after	he	realizes	that	the	South	African	criminal	justice	
system	–	and	therefore	the	state	–	is	incapable	of	protecting	even	children	from	
social	degeneration	of	the	most	obscene	kind.	And	yet	this	form	of	kangaroo‐style	
social	justice	is	shown	to	be	an	ultimately	unsatisfactory	measure,	especially	when	
Mpayipheli	gets	two	of	the	victims	wrong	and	thereby	becomes	a	murderer	himself	
rather	than	a	noble	avenger	of	wrong.	Such	are	the	knife‐point	intricacies	of	the	new	
order.	If	neither	the	state	nor	any	particular	civil	grouping	has	a	monopoly	over	
legitimate	violence,	as	noted	earlier,	then	conditions	are	indeed	averse	and	surely	in	
need	of	intensive	detection.	The	turn	to	crime	fiction	in	South	Africa,	I	maintain,	is	
therefore	far	less	the	escapist,	formulaic	blind	spot	that	it	is	often	made	out	to	be,	
but	rather	a	form	of	social	hermeneutics	in	which	detection	within	an	ethically	
muddled	topography	identifies,	describes	and	explores	the	phenomenon	of	“bad”	
difference.	Alternatively,	such	detection	investigates	the	management	of	difference	
in	ways	that	are	disingenuous	and	deceitful,	as	a	point	at	which	the	new	order	either	
evilly	coheres,	or	falls	apart.	In	the	process,	the	basis	of	“virtuous”	citizenship	within	
the	postapartheid	context	is	being	extensively	rewritten.		
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